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17-year-old Negro boy, was arrested on November 1st in Los
Angeles and, without the aid or advice of friend or counsel,
was thereafter questioned and brutally beaten by the police
twice a day for three days. During this period he consistently
urged his innocence. On the fourth day he was again cruelly
beaten and kicked until, unable to endure the torture any
longer, he said he "was the boy that run away" because he
did not want any more beatings. Following such brutal
treatment, defendant was taken to San Diego by Officer
Blucher, who had participated to some extent in the unlawful
inquisition in Los Angeles. Defendant was then subjected
to further questioning by Blucher and Officer Wells at San
Diego. Again defendant assertedly admitted his particip)1tion in the robbery and shooting of Toy. While both officers
denied holding out any inducements or making any threats to
defendant in San Diego, under all of the circumstances, the
entire situation--shown in part by defendant's uncontradicted testimony and in part by admissions of the police-is
so inherently coercive that its very existence is irreconcilable
with the possession of the mental freedom essential to a valid
confession. Moreover, it does not appear that the San Diego
police cautioned defendant that his previous confession could
not be used against him. For want of such information defendant might have concluded that he could not make his
case worse than he already had made it and, under this im2ression, might have made the statements testified to by
Officer Wells. (See Flamme v. State, 171 Wis. 501 [177 N.W.
-,--., 596, 598]; 2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, p. 998, § 601.)
We conclude, therefore, from facts which are not in conflict,
that the San Diego· confession was :qot voluntary and that it
was· improperly admitted in evidence.
The officers who secured the purported confession may have
been sincere in their belief that defendant was guilty, and
that the end justified the means. Law enforcement officers
must understand, however, that a person suspected of crime
has rights which must be respected, and that undue advantage must not be taken of his fears, hopes or weakness. For
more than a century and a half the mistreatment of persons
in custody has been condemned by our eourts and there is no
better settled rule than that confessions must be voluntary
to be admissible in evidence. As stated by the Supreme Court
in Ashcraft v. State of Tennessee (May, 1944), 322 U.S. 143
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[64 S.Ct. 921, 927, 88 L.Ed. --1 "The Constitution of the
United States stands as a bar against the conviction of any
individual in an American Court by means of a coerced confession. There have been, and are now, certain foreign nations with governments dedieated to an opposite policy: governments which convict individuals with testimony obtained
by police organizations possessed of an unrestrained power
to seize persons suspected of crimes against the state, hold
them in secret custody and wring from them confessions by
physical or mental torture. So long as the Constitution reo
mains the basic law of our Republic, America will not have
that kind of government."
The judgment and order denying a new trial are reversed.
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J.,
and Schauer, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied August
24,1944.

[L. A. No. 18883. In Bank. Aug. 4, 1944.]
ERWIN P. WERNER, Petitioner, v. THE STATE BAR,
Respondent.
[1] Stipulations-Construction.-A stipulation in a disbarment

proceeding that a transcript of the testimony at a criminal
trial was admissible "in this proceeding" could not bc construed as applicable only to a charge of conviction of crime,
where it provided that said testimony might be read and used
with like force and effect as if the witnesses were on the
stand and testifying in person.
[2a, 2b] Attorneys-Disbarment - Evidence. - The transcript of
the evidence at a criminal trial· was admissible hearsay in a
disbarment proceeding against an attorney accused of having
committed the acts charged against him in the criminal prosecution. The requirements of Code Civ. Proc., § 1870, subd. 8,
McK. Dig. References: [1] Stipulations, § 15; [2, 3, 5] Attorneys,
§ 172(9); [4] Evidence, § 274; [6,10] Attorneys, § 141; [7] Evic1cnee, § 236; [8] Attorneys, §§ 175,176; [0] Attorney>:, § 172(8).
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if applicable, were met, where it was stipuhted that T:ne State
Bar need not establish that the witnesses were un:tvailable;
where the parties in the two proceedings were the same, the
attorney having been prosecuted in the name of the People,
and the disbarment proceeding having been presented by The
State Bar acting for the Supreme Court :md for the PeopIe;
and where The State Bar sought to prove the same facts that
the public prosecutor sought to prove.
[3] Id.-Disbarment-Evidence.-In view of the fact that disbarment proceedings are not governed by the rules of procedure
governing civil or criminal litigation, the rules of evidence in
the Code of Civil Procedure may not be applied in such proceedings if they are not necessary to insure a fair hearing.
[4] Evidence-Hearsay-Evidence at Former Trial.-The requJement of Code Civ. Proc., § 1870, Bubd. 8, that the parties ~nd
subject matter be the same, as a condition for use of testimony
given in a former action, is designed to make certain that the
cross-examination in the first proceeding can serve as well in
the second.
[5a-5c] Attorneys-Disbarment-Evidence.-In a disbarment proceeding, the evidence established thut the attorncy offered to
bribe a deputy district attorney, where a person under indictment for theft described an offer to bribe said official by the
accused attorney, ncting through his wife who repeated the
offer severnl times; where this testimony, although impeached,
'VIlS corroborated by the district attorney's employees who
were hidden at said person's home; and where the testimony
of these witnesses showed that the attorney's wife, with his
knowledge, spoke of approaching the deputy district attorney,
and of a charge of a definite sum of money in that connection.
[6] Id.-Disbarment-Acts Involving Moral Turpitude.-An offer
to bribe a dl'puty district attorney made by an attorney, acting
through his wife, is an act of moral turpitude, whether or not
there was any intention to carry out said offer.
[7] Evidence - Hearsay - What Constitutes. - The hearsay rule
does not forbid the introduction of evidence that a statement
has been made when the making of the statement is significant
irrespective of the truth or falsity of its content.
[8] Attorneys - Disbarment - Review - Evidence - Bure.~n of
Proof.-In a proceeding to review a recommendation of disbarment of an attorney, the findings of The State Bar must be
[4J See 10 Cal.Jur. 1128; 20 Am.Jur. 582.
[6J Sec 9 Cal.Jur. Ten-year Supp. ·123, 5 Am.Jur. 428.
[7J See 10 Cal.Jur. 1035; 20 Am.Jur. 403.
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given great weight, and the burden is on the attorney to show
that a particular finding is clearly erroneous or unsupported
in the record.
[9] Id.-Disbarment-Hearing-Findings.-In a disbarment proceeding, where a notice to show cause stat.ed that the attorney
offered to bribe a deputy district attorney, and had attempted
to defraud a person accused of theft by seeking to obtain
money from him on the false representation that it would be
used to bribe said official, a finding of the Board of Governors
that the nttorney had planned with his wife to obtain a sum
of money from the accused thief and had represented to him
that It part of snid sum would be used for having the criminal
charge dismissed, while not following the language of the
nc.)tice, was supported by the evidence and showed a plan to
defraud and an offer to bribe a public official.
[10] Id.-Disbarment-Acts Involving Moral Turpitude.-An attorney who proposed to a person accused of theft that the
htter give him n sum of money on the represent.ation that it
would be used to bribe a deputy district attorney in connection
with the theft charge, committed acts involving moral turpitude that constitute a cause for disbarment, whether or not
the attorney intended to use the money to bribe a public
offiecr or whether he intended to secure it for himself.
PROCEEDING to review n recommendation of disbarment.
Petitioner disbarred.
Mark L. Herron for Petitioner.
A. W. Ashburn and Jerold E. Weil for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-The Board of Governors of The State Bar
of California has recommended that petitioner be disbarred
on the ground that in 1937 he proposed to William McNeil
that the latter give him $2,500 for the purpose of bribing
William E. Simpson, a Deputy District Attorney of Los Angeles County. The ensuing transaction led to petitioner's indictment or attempted grand theft, and he was tried three
times. On the first trial the jury disagreed; on the second the
verdict was guilty, but the judgment was reversed in the District Court of Appr.al (People v. Werner, 29 Cal.App.2d 126
[84 P.2d 168]) ; on the third, petitioner was again convicted,
but the judgment was reversed in this court. (People v. Werner, 16 Ca1.2d 16 [105 P.2d 927].) While petitioner's appeal
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was pending in thi~ court, The State Bar instituted proceedings against him, charging him with having been convicted of
a felony. After the conviction was reverscd, the notice to show
cause was amended to charge that petitioner made the offer
to McNeil with the intention of defrauding him. The local
committee found that petitioner committed the acts charged.
The Board of Governors found that petitioner offered to usa
the fundS he solicited to obtain the illegal dismissal of a chnrge
against McNeil, and that he made the offer with the intention
of defrauding McNeil. The only evidence introduced bcfore
The State Bar was the record of the third trial. Early in the
course of the proceeding, petitioner stipulated that "the testimony as transcribed by the reporter in the ease of The People
of the State of California versus Erwin P. Werner . . . J11~y
be read and used in this proc0cding with like foree anc.l ('[oct
as if the witnesses whose testimony as found in sllid transcript
were on the stand aud testifying in person, Sll bject to all le~al
objections either as to form or as to substance." Petitioner
concedes that if this stipulation is applicable, it is irrevocable,
and that the evidence was propcrly admitted, but contends
that the stipulation became inapplicable because the notice
was amended to charge specific acts instead of conviction of
a felony and that his objection to the admission of the transcript of the criminal trial should have been sustained.
[1] The stipulation provides that the transcript is admissible "in this proceeding." When it was made, it was reasonable to expect that the proceeding would involve precisely the
type of amendment made. Since The State Bar proceeding'
was stayed pending outcome of petitioner's appeal, and sinct!
that outcome was unknown, the proceeding could Dot be continued, in the event of a reversal, without an amendment of
the notice to make it charge the commission of certain acts
involved in the criminal trial rather than conviction at that
trial. The stipulation could hardly be construed as applicable
only to a charge of conviction of crime without becoming
meaningless, for it provides for the reading of the testimony
of witnesses, and there would be no reason for reading such
testimony merely to establish conviction of a crime.
[2a] Even if the stipulation were regarded as inapplicable,
this evidence was admissible. The transcript of the e, idcllce
at the criminal trial was admissible hearsa'y in the State Bar
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proeeeding. Such hearsay is admissible in civil pr~cel'dings if
it is "Thc testimony of a witness deceased, or out of the jurisuiction, or unable to testify, given in a former action between
the same parties, relating to the same matter." (C6de Civ,
Proc., § 1870, sulJd. 8.) In criminal proceedings the rulegoverning the testimony of witnesses other than defendant is
contained in Penal Code, seetion 686, which provides that·
the tpstimony of a witness deceased, insane, out of the juric;diction, or who cannot be discovered, given at a previous trial
of the action, may be admitted. (See People v. Bird, 132
Cal. 261 [64 P. 259].) Petitioner, relying on section 1870,
subdivision 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure, contends that
the conditions imposed therein are not met. [3} It has
been repeatedly held, however, that disbarment proceedings
are not governed by the rules of procedure governing Civil
or criminal litigation. (Johnson v. State Bar, 4 Ca1.2d7·J.l
[52 P.~d 928] ; Herron v. State B(~r, 212 CRI. 1:.16 [298 1',
474]; Matter IIf Danfod, 157 Cal. 4::?5, 430 [108 P. 322];
In re Vaughan, 189 CaL 491 [209 P. 353, 24 .A.L.R. 858].)
There is no legislative requirement, therefore, that the rules
of evidence in the Code of Civil Procedure be applied in disbarment proceedings, although they are frequently invoked
to insure a fair hearing. (See in re Richardson, 209 Cal.
492 [288 P. 669] ; In re Lacy 234 Mo.App. 71 [112 S.W.2d
594] ; In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140 [67 A. 497, 10 Ann. Cas.
539] ; 5 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 19-10), § 1388, p. 103.)
There is no reason for invoking them, however, if they are not
necessary to serve that purpose.
Hearsay evidence is often excluded to insure that all evidence may be tested by cross-examination (Englebretson v.
Ind1tstrjal etc. Com., 170 Cal. 793 [151 P. 421], see 5 Wigmore or Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1362.) On three successive
trials petitioner had the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses against him and the record shows that he fully exercised the right at the last trial so that there is little likelihood
that any significant weakness in the testimony of the witnesfles
was overlookcd. On essentially similar facts, in In re Durant,
80 Conn. 140 [67 A. 497, 10 Ann.Cas. 539], and In re Lacy,
234l\Io.App.71 [112 S.W.2d 594], it was held that the record
of a previous trial wal;' admissible in a disbarment proceeding,
and it was noted that when the court thus exercises its pow('r
to supervise its officers in a proceeding in which a jury h:J,~
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no part, there is no need to adhere strictly to rules made primarily to govern jury trials.
[2b] In any event the requirements of section 1870, subdivision 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure, which petitioner
contends is applicable to this proceeding, havc bcen met.
That section imposes three conditions upon the use of testimony given in a former action: the witnesses must be unavailable, the parties must be the same, and the subject matter of
the proceedings must be the same. It was stipulated that The
State Bar need not establish that the witnesses were unavailable. Petitioner was prosecuted in the name of the People
of California, and the trial was conducted by attorneys representing the People. In the present proceeding the case against (
petitioner is presented by The State Bar, acting as the arm of
this court and also representing the People of the State. In
reality the parties are the same. Petitioner's contention that
the subject matter is not the same is based on the fact that
this proceeding is for disbarment, whereas the earlier case
was a criminal prosecution. The Legislature, however, aware
that a disbarHlcnt proceeding is different from any other type
of action, could hardly have intended to preclude the use of
the transcript of an earlier proceeding in a proceeding for
disbarment. The State Bar seeks to prove the same facts that
the public prosecutor sought to prove so that both proceedings actually do concern the same matter. (Fredericks v.
Judah, 73 Cal. 604 [15 P. 305] ; McAlister v. Dungan, 108
Cal.App. 185 [291 P. 419].) [4] The requirement that
parties and subject matter be the same is designed to make
certain that the cross-examination in the first proceeding can
serve as well in the second. (Lyon v. Rhode Island Co., 38
R.I. 252 [94 A. 893, L.R.A. 1916A 983] ; 5 Wigmore on Evidence (1940), § 1388, p. 95.) Since this purpose is fulfilled,
the transcript was properly admitted. Moreover, petitioner
was free to introduce additional eVIdence in his own behalf
but did not avail himself of this right.
[5a] Petitioner contends that this evidence, even if admissible, does not establish that he offered to bribe the deputy
district attorney. McNeil was under indictment for grand
theft because of certain transactions in securities with a Mrs.
Bovell. Petitioner had served as his attorney in similar situations until they had a disagreement over fees. Some time
after the commencement of this prosecution against McNeil,
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however, petitioner attempted to communicate with him, calling on McNeil's attorney in the litigation over the fee as well
as on his attorney in the Bovell matter. McNeil, while at
first unwilling to see him, finally telegraphed petitioner that
he get in touch with him. On the 19th or 20th of August,
1937, petitioner called on McNeil, and in the following week
several conferences took place between petitioner, McNeil,
and petitioner's wife. Afterthe first visit by petitioner, when
McNeil allegedly offered to bribe Simpson, McNeil communicated with the district attorney's office. A dictaphone was
placed in McNeil's home and listeners were posted in his basement.
McNeil was the principal witness against petitioner. He
testified that petitioner said, when he first called on August
19th or 20th, that "Mrs. Werner had some good ideas and
that he had Eome good ideas as to how to handle it in the District Attorney's office ... and he said that Mrs. Werner was
very well acquainted with Mr. Simpson, the Chief Deputy
District Attorney there, and that for about $2,500 he could
get Mr. Simpson to, as he said, kick this case out of the District Attorney's Office; in other words, he could square it up,
but it would be necessary, naturally, to satisfy Mrs. Bovell.
. . . " McNeil testified that on the same occasion petitioner
stated "that he was satisfied that he could take care of it in
the District Attorney's Office, by paying Mr. Simpson $2,500,
and spreading some money around the police department.
... " Petitioner and his wife called on McNeil the following
Monday, and after a brief conversation petitioner went upstairs. McNeil testified that meanwhile he and Mrs. Werner
discussed the arrangements to be made with the district attorney's office, and that "She said anything that was to be
handled in the settlement of this matter in the District Attorney's Office, she would handle, herself; and if she didn't get
to handle the money she would not have anything to do with
it, because any time theretofore when they had any cases
of this kind, if Pete got hold of the money she never got any
of it, and that she could have this case dismissed in the District Attorney's Office by paying to Bill Simpson, the Chief
Deputy District Attorney, $2,500." McNeil then testified
that subsequently petitioner returned to the room and the
conversation devolved upon possible arrangements with Mrs.

'I
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Bovell. Thereafter petitioner went out to a drugstore, and
Juring his absence discussion of the arrangements with the
district attorney's office was resumed, Mrs. Werner again insisting that she handle the money and direct the arrangements. On the following Thursday when the three met again
there was a dispute between petitioner and McNeil as to the
funds required for settling the case. Petitioner testified that
" . . . he [McNeil] said, 'I will put up $10,000 to clear up
your situation, Bergman and Mrs. BoveU, and give up the
equity in the Crenshaw house and the furniture and these two
houses in Culver City as soon as you can come and tell me
that the District .Attorney will dismiss my case .. .''' Petitioner replied, "You want me to settle this case for you on
jawbone," but "It can't be done." According to McNeil it
was then arranged that Mrs. Werner visit McNeil's house
alone, but there is some dispute as to petitioner's knowledge
of this arrangement. In any event, on Friday afternoon Mrs.
Werner called and indicated that arrangements with Simpson
had been completed, and again warned that she must handle
the cash and the arrangements with the district attorney's
office. On Friday evening petitioner and Mrs. Werner returned to McNeil's house. After petitioner was told that the
cash for all the arrangements would be turned over Saturday,
McNeil turned over to Mrs. Werner, while petitioner was out,
an envelope supposedly containing the cash. Actually it contained some paper and one dollar bills. Petitioner and Mrs.
Werner were arrested as they left the house.
The testimony of McNeil thus describes an offer to bribe
Simpson by petitioner, acting through Mrs. Werner who repeated the offer several times. The fraudulence of such an
offer is revealed by Simpson's testimony that he did not know
Mrs. Werner, although he had met her once, and that he was
absent from Los Angeles at the time the offer was made.
[6] In any event, the making of such an offer, whether or
not there was any intention to carry it out, is an act of moral
turpitUde.
[5b] McNeil's own testimony was impeached, for it was
shown that he was hostile to petitioner, that he had been convicted of a felony, and that he had made various inconsistent
statements as to the time and substance of some of the conversations described. His testimony, however, was corroborated
by the employees of the district attorney who had been posted
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in the cellar, Miss Ruthe Wood, a secretary who took notes
of the conversations in shorthand, and Mr. Frank T. Allen,
an investigator who took some longhand notes.
Miss Wood's notes record that at the Wednesday conference, while petitioner was absent, Mrs. Werner said, "I want
you before we leave here to make Erwin promise that he will
talk with me and we will agree with you on everything that is
to be done, because what Pete will do-and I want you not
to let him do is have any contact with the District Attorney's
office ... I wouldn't go up there. I see Mr. Shnpson-very
old friend." Werner insisted on having control of the funds,
saying, "I want you to pay me the money that is a part of this
frame-up. " Mr. Allen's notes likewise show that Mrs. Werner stated, "I will see Mr. Simpson; very old friend," and
that she insisted on control of the funds.
Miss Wood's notes record further that on petitioner's return McNeil said to petitioner, "Helen and I had a talk
while you were out ... Helen is cocksure and you are and I am
that this Bovell matter will be settled. This house and furniture plus $5,000. I don't care if you pay Bergman and the
Police Department. As quick as we can all arrive at just
what is necessary and the quicker I can hand it over-I don't
want a receipt-it is a deal between three people ... I am
willing to go on that and I am willing to split another $5,000.
There is no use to go ahead and hire a lawyer and go to trial
and not know what the outeome is ... I will let Helen and
you work out the details. I believe it would be best that this
thing can be worked out under her direction of what she has
in mind ... If Helen and you can come out at noon tomorrow
and tell me that is all set and another $5,000 on the outside.
. . ." Mrs. Werner: "I am not going to take you for one
thing so far as my little end of it goes." McNeil: "You come
out and tell me what you can do, it is worth something like
that." Mrs. Werner; "I want to see one person and I can do
that in the morning. They won't know what I want."
Miss Wood and Mr. Allen were away at the time of the
Thursday conversation, but took notes again on Friday afternoon when Mrs. Werner appeared alone. Miss Wood's notes
show that Mrs. Werner told McNeil that Simpson would instruct Mr. Arterberry, the deputy in charge of the McNeil
case, to dismiss it; and that the following conversation oc-
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curred: McNeil: "The house, furniture and a deed to those
houses out there and $10,000." Mrs. Werner: "That is Bovshover (Mrs. Bovell's manager.)" McNeil:" 'rhe other to
slide through D ..A. office." Mrs. Werner: "This one usually
charges $2,500."
Miss Wood testified that there was a conversation on Friday night between petitioner, McNeil, and Mrs. Werner as
follows: McNeil: ".About the other part. I am going to let
Helen handle the money. I want you to be sure and be down
here by the 12th.... This case is going to come up the 27th
and I want it booted out of the District .Attorney's office. I
suggest this: Two fingers in the pie is a bad thing. If you
are going to handle the District Attorney's end of it, if you
want Pete to come in, he comes in, but not unless you want it.
Is that right Pete?" . Werner: "Yes." McNeil: "Pete handles the other end; you handle the District Attorney's office.
Pete does only as you tell him and if it goes wrong,· you are
the one that gummed it up, Helcn." Mrs. Werner: "I won't
gum it up. 1 have never gotten in a mess up there on anything I have tried." The testimony of these witnesses shows
that Mrs. Werner spoke of approaching Simpson and of a
charge of $2,500 in that connection, and that petitioner was
aware that his wife was to approach the office of the district
attorney.
The fact that all references to Simpson occurred while
petitioner was absent may be attributed to Mrs. Werner's
desire to retain control of the funds, and to the likelihood that
petitioner wished to remain in the background, having recently been subjected to criminal prosecution and to suspension proceedings by The State Bar. (See Werner v. The State
Bar, 13 Ca1.2d 666 [91 P.2d 881].) There was evidence that
petitioner had previous experience with dictaphones, and some
of the conversations were carried on in tones so low that
Allen and Miss Wood were unable to hear them. It was Mrs.
Werner who claimed to know Simpson, and was therefore the
logical person to plan the approach to his office. The fact
that Mrs. Werner proposed to bribe Simpson shortly after
she arrived with petitioner to establish means to free McNeil,
suggests that she had been led by petitioner to believe that
such object was contemplated in the negotiations. There is
additional corroboration of McNeil's testimony in the testimony of Mrs. Schapiro, McNeil's attorney in the litigation
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over fees, that petitioner told her when trying to communicate with McNeil, "You know I can have that case of the
People against McNeil dismissed," and by the testimony of
Mr. Newmire, McNeil's attorney in the Bovell matter, that
petitioner stated to him that "he was in a position to square
the beef for Mac," and "that it was not too late yet to fix
the matter."
[7] It is contended by petitioner that the testimony of
McN eil, Allen and Miss Wood, relative to the statements made
by Mrs. Werner were hearsay as to petitioner. The hearsay
rule, however, does not forbid the introduction of evidence
that a statement has been made when the making of the statement is significant irrespective of the truth or falsity of its
content. (Smith v. Whittier, 95 Cal. 279, 293 [30 P. 529] ;
see 6 Wigmore, op. cit. supra, § 1772, p. 191; see cases collected at 10 Cal.JHr., § 288, p. 1036.) Mrs. Werner's declarations that she would see Simpson were not offered as evidence
that she intended to do so, but the making of the offer lends
credibility to McNeil's testimony that petitioner made a similar offer.
People v. Werner, 16 Ca1.2d 216 [105 P.2d 927], does not
establish that Mrs. Werner's statements may not be considered
in determining whether petitioner offered to bribe Simpson.
Petitioner was there appealing from a conviction for attempted grand theft. The conviction was reversed, first, because McNeil's knowledge of the intention of petitioner and
his wife, and his cooperation in turning over the envelope
supposedly containing the funds made impossible either theft
or an attempt at theft; secondly, because an attempt requires
a direct effectual act in furtherance of the crime attempted,
and although Mrs. Werner took the envelope she did so without petitioner's knowledge with the intention of keeping the
proceeds from him, so that her act could not be attributed
to him. The statement that the taking by Mrs. Werner was
"foreign to the alleged common plan" cannot be regarded
as denying the existence of such a plan.
Petitioner questions the accuracy of Miss Wood's notes,
specifying various omissions, testimony that her symbols for
"I" and "he" were much alike, and her dcpendence on the
context of her notes and on her memory to determine their
meaning. There is no showing, however, that the similarity
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in symbols led to any substantial error, and it was not essen, tial for Miss Wood to attempt to record everything.
[5c] Much of the testimony indicating petitioner's guilt
was contradicted by petitioner and Mrs. Werner. It was reasonable, however, to attach greater credence to the testimony
of McNeil, for it was corroborated by independent witnesses,
than to that of petitioner and his wife. It is reasonable to
suppose that the testimony of the latter would be influenced
by the fact that they were charged with a crime of which
they had already been found guilty. (Oaldwell v. Weiner,
203 Cal. 543 [264 P. 1110] ; Davis v. Judson, 159 Cal. 121,
128 [113 P. 147] ; Blanc v. Oonner, 167 Cal. 719, 723 [141 P.
217].)
The evidence shows unquestionably that petitioner was trying to make some arrangement for the dismissal of the charge
against McNeil. Petitioner contends, however, that the evidence shows that the arrangement contemplated was restitution to Mrs. BoveU and a demonstration to Mr. Arterberry,
the Deputy District Attorney in charge of the BoveU matter,
of the weakness of the pro.3ecution's case. It appears from
Miss Wood's notes and from testimony of other witnesses that
there was much conversation on the possibility of satisfying
Mrs. Bovell and of convincing her that she overstated the,
case against McNeil, so that she would lose her effectiveness
as principal witness for Arterberry. Thus Miss Wood's notes
show that petitioner said, "I think we can put a story in her
mind to the effect that there is nothing criminal about this;
that Mr. Bovshover got her to say certain things that weren't
true. " The concern of petitioner and Mrs. Werner over Mrs.
BoveU's attitude and the presentation of a strong case to
Arterberry is not inconsistent with the evidence that they
proposed to bribe Simpson. The reason given for bribing
Simpson was that Arterberry was subject to his authority.
Miss Wood's notes record that when Mrs. Werner was asked
by McNeil, "Do you think he [Simpson] has control of Arterberry?" she replied, "Completely." Simpson, however,
could hardly direct Arterberry to dismiss the prosecution
without givinp. some reason; otherwise, not only Arterberry
but Mrs. BoveU and her attorney, Mr. Bergman, would question the dismissal. An adjustment with Mrs. BoveU and an
explanation to Arterberry for the dismissal of the prosecution
would be natural if Simpson were to be bribed.
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Petitioner contends also that Mrs. Werner was not going' to bribe Simpson, but was going to hirc anothcr attorncy to present the case to the district attorney's office;
that this plan was implicit in her reference, made in petitioner's presence, to seeing a certain person; and that this
plan accounts for the $2,500 of the $10,000 that was to be
given Mrs. Werner, otherwise unaccounted for except for the
testimony that it was to be used for a bribe. To support this
argument, the attorney who defended Mrs. Werner on the
criminal trial, and who now represents petitioner, testified
that he was to be the attorney to present the case to the district attorney's office. This evidence was brought forward
for the first time on the third trial and the conflict between
it and the testimony of McNeil, Miss Wood,' and Allen was
resolved against petitioner by the local committee and the
Board of Governors.
[8] It is well established that the findings of The State
Bar must be given great weight. (Light v. State Bar, 14 Cal.
2d 328 [94 P.2d 35] ; F1trman v. State Bar, 12 Ca1.2d 212 [83
P.2d 12] ; Hizar v. State Bar, 20 Cal.2d 223 [124 'P.2d 812] ;
Utz v. State Bar, 21 Cal.2d 100, 104 [130 P.2d 377] ; Petersen
v. State Bar, 21 Ca1.2d 866, 870 [136 P.2d561].) The burden is on petitioner to show that the finding is clearly erroneous or unsupported in the record. (Hizar v. State Bar, supra,
at 227; Petersen v. State Bar, supra, at 870; Moura, v. State
Bar, 18 Ca1.2d 31 [112 P.2d 629] ; Kennedy v. State Bar, 13
Ca1.2d236, 240 [88 P.2d 920].) Petitioner has not sustained
this burden.
[9] Petitioner contends that the finding of the Board of
Governors is not within the issues raised by the notice. The
notice stated that petitioner proposed to pay a sum of money
to William Simpson for the purpose of bribing him in con.
ncction with the easc of People v. McNe~'l, and that petitioner
attempted to defraud McNeil by seeking to obtain from him
a sl1m of money on the false representation that it would be
u.c;cd to bribe Simpson. The local committee found that petitioner made such an offer, and that it was intended as a means
of dc:l:r:mning McNeil. The finding of the Board of Governors
was less explicit, declaring that petitioner entered into a plan
with his wife to obtain $10,000 from William McNeil, and
"represented to said McNeil that a part of said amount would
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be utilized for the purpose uf illegally arranging for the disIIliss:"!1 of a criminal charge pending against McNeil. . . . "
While this finding does not follow the language of the notice,
it is amply ~upported by the evidence, and shows a plan to
defraud and an offer to bribe a public officer. The board
also found "that as a part of said plan the respondent, with
his wife, sought to obtain $10,000 from William McNeil with
intent to commit grand theft of a portion of said amount."
[10] Whether petitioner intended to use the money to bribe
a public officer or whether he intended to secure it for himself, he committed acts involving moral turpitude that constitute a cause for disbarment.
It is therefore ordered that the petitioner be disbarred
from the practice of law in California and that his n:Jme
be struck from the roll of attorneys, this order to become effective thirty days after it is filed.
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
SHENK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the
order of disbarment on the ground that the transcript of the
testimony of witnesses taken on the trial of the petitioner for
the criminal offense was admissible in evidence in the disbarment proceeding pursuant to the stipulation entered into by
the petitioner, and that the evidence supports the conclusion
that disbarment should follow. However, I dissent from the
determination that, aside from the stipulation, and assuming
unavailability of the witnesses, the transcript of the testimony
taken at the trial of the petitioner on a felony charge as to
which there was no final jUdgment of conviction, may be
introduced in a disbarment proceeding against him to prove
the commission of acts of moral turpitude. In a case of conviction, the testimony would be unnecessary as the fact of
conviction is ground for disbarment. In my opinion this
court in the absence of a stipulation, should not approve the
introduction in evidence in a disbarment proceeding of the
transcribed testimony of witnesses taken in the trial of an
attorney on a charge of which he was not fiu:J.lly convicted,
to prove acts of moral turpitude, much less in a calJe, such as
this, where the determination of the question is not a necessary ground for disbarment.
Furthermore, I am in disagreement with the statement in
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the majority opmlOn that the rcquirements of sectiun 1870,
subdivision 80f the Code of Civil Procedure have been met,
in that the testimony was "given in a former action betwer.n
the same parties, relating to the same matter." The majority
do not come to the conclusion that the parties and subject
matter are the same. (Cf. United States v. A.luminum Co. of
.Am., [D.C.-N.Y.] 1 F.R.D. 48.) The opinion avoic1s the
necessity for such a conclusion by stating in essence that the
effect is the same; that in disbarment proceedings the law
does not require a strict adherence to the rules of procedure
governing civil and criminal cases, and that there is no reason
for invoking such rules unless they are necessary to insure
a fair hearing. This court has recognized that in hearings in
disbarment proceedings there is a mea."ure of freedom from
the rules of procedure applicable to the conrts. But this court
has also adhered to the requirement that an attorney may not
be st.ripped of his privileges except on competent and legal
evidence. In In re Richardson, 209 Cal. 492 [21:18 P. GG:)],
it was pointed out that it is not so much a matter of procedural rules, as it is the kind of evidence that is necessary
and sufficient to deprive an attorney of his right to practice.
In that decision, in holding that henrsay evidence is not competent for the purpose, it was said at page 499: "Legal evidence alone should be required to deprive a duly admitted
attorney of the vitally important and valuable right to practice his profession, and to impose upon him the stigma of disbarment. The court can be asked in such review only to
consider the sufficiency of legal evidence. We are of the view,
therefore, that only legal evidence, as that tcrm is understood
among lawyers, should receive the eOllsideration of the Board
of Governors and committees of The State Bar in the exercise
of the disciplinary features of the Bar Act." That view was
followed with reliance on the Riehardson case in Masters v.
Board of Dental Examiners, 15 Cal.App.2d 506 [59 P.2d
827].
The well understood test in this state as to the admissibility
of the testimony of witnesses taken at a previuus trial, where
there hos been opportullity for cross-examination, is llOt the
court's opiniun as to the adequacy of the cross-eX!lminlltlOu
and fairness in the particular case, but is t.he identity of suh.
ject matter and parties. In Neblett v. State Bar, 17 Ca1.2d
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77 [109 P.2d 340J, it was noted that the differences in the
nature of the proceedings, in the parties, and in the suhject
matter inherent in a previous trial and in a disbarment proceeding, might greatly affect the interests and therefore the
results produced by cross-examination of the same witnrssc.s.
The cases supporting the majority and minority rules governing the admissibility of testimony taken in a previoul'! trial
when the witnesses are unavailable, as an exception to the
rule excluding hearsay, are collected in 21 Ann.Cas. page 179,
et seq. The majority rule, prevailing in England, Canada,
and in our federal and state courts, requires essential identity
of the matter in iRsue and of the parties, the latter comprehending privies in blood, in law or in estate. The statement
in the text of the minority rule permitting opportunity for
cross-examination (instead of requiring identity of parties
and subject matter), as the test of admissibility-the rule
applied by the decision in the present case-is supported by
the citation of a case from each of two states, Connecticut and
Nevada. The decision adds one from the State of Missouri.
There may be others, but it seems to me that the majority
rule, which has been adopted in this state by statute, should
not be disregarded in any determination of the question.
Carter, J., concurred.

Aug. 1944]

!MPERIAL BEV1!jRAGE Co. V. SUPERiOR COURT

[So F. No. 16929. In Bank.

1327

Aug. 4, 1944.]

IMPERIAL BEVERAGE COMPANY (a Corporation) et al.,
Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY et al., Respondents.
[8. F. No. 16930. In Bank.

Aug. 4, 1944.]

CHARLES E. HIRES COMPANY (a Corporation), Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF AIJAMEDA
COUNTY et al., Respondents.
[1] Appeal-Supersedeas-Judgment Directing Payment of Money.
-A judgment for costs is not a judgment directing the payment of money mentioned in Code Civ. Proc., § 942, and is
therefore stayed by the provisions of § 949 of the same code.
[2a, 2b] Id.-Effect-Powers of Trial Court Pending Appeal.An appeal from a judgment and a stay of further proceedings in the trial court do not deprive that court of jurisdiction to settle a bill of exceptions; in such a situation the court
ordinarily has jurisdiction, and it is its duty to take all nece!;·
sary steps and make all necessary orders that a proper and
correct record on appeal may be prepared. Therefore an order
staying proceedings, while limited to proceedings on appeal,
is within the jurisdiction of the trial court to make and enforce.
[3] Id.-Judgments and Orders Appealable-Special Orders Made
After Final Judgment.-An order granting a stay of proceedings, while .limited to proceedings on appeal, is not appealable
as a special order made after final judgment within Code
Civ. Proc., § 963, as such an order neither stays nor enforces
the judgment-which was automatically stayed by the appeal
itself-but serves merely to extend or continue the time for
the preparation of the record on appeal.
[4] Certiorari - When Writ Lies - Excess of Jurisdiction. - In
order that relief by certiorari may be granted, there must
have been an excess of jurisdiction by an inferior tribunal
[1] See 2 Cal.Jur. 427; 3 Am.Jur. 195.
[2] See 2 Cal.Jur. 180; 3 Am.Jur. 192.
[4] See 4 Cal.Jur. 1022; 10 Am.Jur. 527.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 395; [2] Appeal
and Error, § 384; [3] Appeal and Error, § 51; [4] Certiorari, §§ 9,
12; (5] Motions and Orders, § 23; [6,7] Military, § 2a.

